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Abstract 
Using field data from a large U.S. technology transfer organization with over $50 million in 
annual revenue, we investigate four related issues regarding the sharing of licensing revenues by 
academic teams. First, we find that the main empirical regularity is a heuristic-based allocation of 
shares 1/n, equal shares to all unique inventors in a single invention team, and the use of the partition 
dependence (PD) rule, whereby inventors receive equal share within an invention and shares across 
inventions included in the same contract are equal. Second, when we examine the performance 
consequences of such equal sharing, we find it is negatively related to performance. Third, using both 
matched sample estimations and examining strategic switchers, i.e., the case of inventors who switch 
between equal and unequal sharing, we find that self-selection rather than shirking explains the 
negative performance. Finally, the pattern of their switching is random in time—i.e., there is no 
movement toward unequal rules over time so inventors are not learning to use unequal rules. 
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Most inventions, especially the most valuable ones, are now created by teams of academic 
scientists (Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998; Singh & Fleming, 2010; Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 
2007). How academic inventing teams share potential royalty income from a license is an important 
question. Most licensed academic inventions are at embryonic stage and require substantial effort 
from inventors subsequent to licensing (Jensen and Thursby, 2001), and the inventors have competing 
demands on their time, including teaching and other research projects. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) hypothesize that groups distribute incentives to inspire optimal 
contributions by their members. Another view, in the judgment and decision-making literature, is that 
individuals and groups seek to conserve cognitive energy and adopt simple distribution rules, such as 
allocating equal shares to all inventors.
1
 It remains uncertain whether such simple rules are effective 
motivators or impose a cost by reducing motivation. In a field study, we gathered data on how 
academic inventor teams at a large U.S. technology-transfer organization with over $50 million per 
year in revenue share licensing revenues. We ask a set of five related questions:  (1) Do teams 
containing members with heterogeneous experience and talent split potential proceeds from their 
efforts using heuristic rules? (2) When are teams less likely to rely on heuristic rules? (3) What are the 
performance consequences of using heuristic rules, if any? (4) Is differential performance between 
heuristic royalty regimes and non-heuristic or unequal royalty regimes driven by self-selection, by 
shirking, or both? and (5) Do strategic switchers, i.e., inventors who switch between heuristic and 
non-heuristic regimes, learn to discard heuristic  rules over time? 
A long tradition primarily of laboratory studies in the judgment and decision-making 
literature shows that decision makers sometimes rely on simple rules of thumb, or heuristics, and 
ignore relevant information. But more recently, scholars in this stream of literature have been taking 
insights from the laboratory to study field data.  A few papers that have combined experimental and 
field studies have shown that people use heuristics to decide how many hours they want to work 
(Camerer, et al.,1997), betting on winning or losing streaks of basketball teams (Camerer and Weber, 
1999), allocate funds between risky gambles (Fox and Clemen, 2005; Fox and Rottenstreich, 2003; 
Langer and Fox, 2003), retirement accounts (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001), and businesses within 
companies (Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo, 2011). For example, using both experimental and field 
evidence, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) found naïve diversification in defined contribution savings 
                                                          
1
 In this paper we take a narrow definition of heuristics. We treat the 1/n rule and partition dependence rule 
as heuristics. There could be other rules, for instance, the lead inventor gets a higher share. We treat only the 
rules that appear to ignore heterogeneous abilities of inventors, for instance in our setting 1/n rule which is 
equal allocation to each inventor, as a heuristic rule. We treat any other rules that may have been based on 
ability of the inventors as not a heuristic. It is possible that some teams are perfectly homogeneous and a case 
could be made for such teams that the 1/n rule may be optimal.  
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plans, such that investors followed a “1/n strategy,” dividing their contributions equally across their 
plan’s funds. Depending on the variety of assets in a mutual fund plan—for instance, either two equity 
and one bond option or one equity and two bond options—this simple strategy leads to very different 
allocations for similar people.  A more thorough review of this literature is available in Kahneman 
(2011), Kahneman and Fredrick (2005), and Pruitt (1981). 
A more complex rule than the 1/n rule is the partition dependence (PD) rule, which  implies 
that allocations are made hierarchically based on the order they are observed by decision makers (Fox 
and Rottenstreich, 2003). For example, in experimental settings using experienced executives as 
subjects, Bardolet, Lovallo, and Fox (2011) found participants allocated capital to divisions of a 
hypothetical firm in radically different proportions based on the order that the same objective 
information was presented. When executives were provided with information grouped by three 
geographic divisions and then by one to three product subdivisions in each of the geographic 
divisions, they first allocated equally to each geographic division and then divided each share by the 
number of product subdivisions within the geographic area. When executives were provided with 
information in the opposite order, by product divisions and then by geographic subdivisions, they 
allocated equally to each product division and then equally to each geographic subdivision. Thus, for 
the same hypothetical company with the same information, different division groupings resulted in 
widely different allocations.  As such, the effects of an observed pattern on allocation varied not 
because of rational differences in the worthiness of projects but because of where managers’ attention 
was first focused. Due to the coarseness of the data, Bardolet et al. (2011) were not able to test the 
partition dependence hypotheses on field or archival data. In this study, we test partition dependence 
with field data.  
In this paper we extend the examination of the 1/n and PD rules, hereafter “N or PD.” Prior N 
or PD work has focused on individual decision makers. More specifically, most prior evidence for PD 
has come primarily from laboratory studies wherein a single individual estimates probabilities or 
allocates funds to projects. Recent work on PD has extended this to study field experiments using 
sports events spanning several weeks and horse race predictions by individual decision makers 
(Sonnemann, Camerer, Fox, and Langer, 2013). In this paper, we suggest that groups also use N or 
PD rules to divide the returns from their joint effort. In our context, groups divide royalty shares, 
which are both rewards for previous work and incentives for future work. 
This paper makes three contributions to extant literatures. First, whereas the prevalence of the 
1/n rule has been found in groups, this paper offers the first field evidence of the prevalence of the PD 
rule among teams distributing rewards and incentives.
2
 We suggest that when multiple inventions are 
                                                          
2
 Royalties are a combination of rewards for past input and incentives for future effort. 
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bundled and licensed, inventions rather than the inventors are the first naturally occurring partitions 
that come to mind. Hence, if teams strictly use PD heuristic rule, allocations to inventions should be 
equal regardless of the quality of the inventions and also equally to inventors in each of those 
inventions. Our results support this prediction.  
Second, we use a bargaining model suggested by Hellman and Wasserman (2011) to predict 
when teams deviate from N or PD to share royalty income. As predicted by the model, we find that 
larger teams and teams consisting of individuals with successful experience are less likely to engage 
in equal splitting of royalty income than other teams.  Inventions that earn high royalty income after 
licensing are less likely to be licensed using N or PD rules. Thus, we find evidence both for the use of 
simple rules to share royalty income and for the rational account provided by the bargaining model.  
To investigate whether the underperformance of inventions in heuristic regimes is driven by self-
selection or shirking, we follow a stringent matching method, “coarsened exact matching” (CEM), 
developed by Iacus et al (2009), to match licenses with and without N or PD royalty sharing regimes. 
Using a matching theory prevalent in innovation studies (Azoulay et al, 2009; Singh and Agarwal, 
2011), we match licenses that have an equal sharing rule with other licenses with similar quality of 
inventors and invention but do not use a heuristic sharing rule.
3
 We then examine the difference in 
performance of similar quality inventions at the time of licensing, including those that used N or PD 
rules and those that did not. The implication of such a matching procedure is that, after matching, any 
difference in performance for two nearly equal quality of inventions and with similar quality inventors 
is due to the treatment effect of the royalty sharing regime used. We find that N or PD rules for 
allocation of rewards are not inefficient after accounting for low-quality inventions being assigned to 
N or PD regime. In other words, the difference in performance is due to self-selection, and not due to 
shirking. Finally, we find that individuals do not learn over time to refrain from using non-heuristic 
regimes. The evidence we finds suggests that the use of non-heuristic regimes depends simply on 
items like the potential size of the royalty prize at stake- the greater the amount of money at stake, the 
more likely inventors are to adopt non-heuristic regime.  
1. Research Site 
For our research site we selected a technology transfer office (TTO) at a large U.S. university. 
This university has one of the largest TTOs in the U.S. with income over $50 million and is well 
respected for its patenting and licensing capabilities. The data for this study were collected in 2007, 
when one of the authors regularly visited the TTO and interviewed intellectual property managers, 
                                                          
3
 Again, there are many types of heuristic rules possible, in this paper we are only referring to N or PD as 
heuristic rules. 
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licensing managers, legal counsel, and the senior management team to develop a deeper 
understanding of the TTO and its processes.  
The TTO documents all invention disclosures made by the university faculty. Once an inventor 
approaches the TTO with a claim of an invention with potential commercial value, a file with a 
unique identifier number is created, and an intellectual property manager (IPM) is assigned to the 
case. The IPM interviews the inventors to elicit detailed information about the invention and its 
commercial potential. Based on the interviews, the IPM writes a report on whether the TTO should 
file for IP protection. All new disclosures are discussed at a monthly meeting at which all IPMs, 
licensing managers, legal counsel, and senior management of the TTO are typically present. Once the 
decision on IP protection has been made, the licensing managers are included in detailed discussions 
with inventors on strategies to effectively market the IP. The legal counsel then prepares the 
disclosure for patent protection filing with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and/or in other 
countries.  
The sample consists of 415 licensed contracts from 1990 to 2004 that include two or more 
inventors.  The graduate office does an “equity review” to identify all inventors who contributed an 
“inventive step”—i.e., some original conjecture. Hence, some objective vetting of inventors does 
occur. However, the inventors decide among themselves how great a share in a licensed invention 
each should receive, and they communicate this decision to the TTO. Each contract lists how the 
inventors’ portion of the revenue received by the TTO from the licensing firm will be distributed 
among the inventors. Outsiders and even the TTO are generally uncertain about how great a share an 
inventor should receive.  For instance, a TTO manager reports:  
(T)here is some question in my mind as to who is truly an inventor here.  X clearly conceived and 
directed the work.  Y is a past student from fall of 1997, Z (a lab technician), did experiments to 
establish the appropriate levels of lactate, anti-oxidant and colorant.  Y’s potentially inventive 
contribution involved her identification of monasticin as a desirable colorant, as X was not 
familiar with it.  X’s current student, V, has done work to optimize concentration of the 
ingredients, but does not appear to have made an inventive contribution thus far.  
The licensing manager corresponds with the inventors before the signing of the licensing 
agreement and incorporates the inventors’ decision. There are 644 unique inventors in the sample.   
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2. How often are N & PD rules used to distribute income from royalties? 
1/n rule. A rational perspective might argue that when a significant amount of money is at stake, 
the use of heuristic rules to share rewards should be minimal. On the other hand, the behavioral view 
suggests that the use of heuristic rule to share rewards is invariant to stake size. The contrasting 
theories give qualitative different predictions but no specific point estimates (Camerer & Lowenstein, 
2004). Harris and Joyce (1982) offer evidence from a laboratory study on the prevalence of the 1/n 
rule to distribute incentives among group members. They find that groups shared income equally 60% 
of the time and allocated expenses equally 70% of the time, leading to unequal incomes. In a sample 
containing a representative population of U.S. adults founding nascent ventures, the 1/n rule was 
prevalent, with 65% of the teams sharing equity equally (Kotha and George, 2012). This is a much 
higher rate than in a sample of venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial teams, wherein approximately 
34% of teams spilt equity equally (Hellman and Wasserman, 2011). Hence, for a field study, an ex 
ante expectation of the range 1/n usage is large, falling anywhere from 34% to 65% based on prior 
evidence. 
In our sample, of the 415 licensed contracts, 278 include only one invention; the remaining 137 
contracts have two or more inventions that are bundled and licensed (see Figure 1). The number of 
single partition inventions is 278, of which nearly 81% are equally shared among the inventors, 
showing that 1/n explains the vast majority of royalty share distribution perfectly—a much higher 
prevalence of the use of 1/n rule than found in prior work on groups sharing incentives. The rate we 
find in our sample is also much higher than the prevalence of 1/n rule found by Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001), who reported that 21% to 34% of individuals in a laboratory study chose equal allocation of 
their savings to stocks and bonds. One implication of this descriptive result might be that the 
prevalence of 1/n rule is amplified when decisions are made by a group rather than by individuals. 
-INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE- 
To confirm the descriptive results for 1/n, we estimate the share an inventor receives with control 
variables for heterogeneity in inventor human capital in addition to individual and period fixed 
effects. We predict the share an inventor receives in an agreement. The inventor share is greater than 
zero and less than 100%. The explanatory variables are publications experience, and invention 
experience. We count the number of published articles by an inventor prior to the date of the focal 
invention, and then subtract the average publications of other inventors on the team, the intuition 
being that if an inventor-i has a higher number of publications than his team members, then this 
variable will be larger. Hence the expectation would be the greater the relative publication experience 
of an inventor over his team members, the greater the share of royalty income that the inventor 
receives. Invention experience is the difference between the average of invention experience of the 
other inventors in the team and the experience of the focal inventor, whose share in the royalty 
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income we are estimating. The theory explanatory variable is 1/n, which is the share a focal inventor 
receives as predicted by 1/n rule. In Table 1 we report the descriptive statistics and correlations of 
these variables. 
-INSERT TABLE 1 HERE- 
 We follow Bardolet et al. (2011) in predicting the share each focal inventor receives and use 
the share predicted by the 1/n rule as an explanatory variable. The intuition here is that once human 
capital variables of the inventors are accounted for, then simple rules are irrelevant to the share an 
inventor receives. We used inventor fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant inventor 
factors and also used year indicators to control for unobserved period effects
4
. We report the results of 
these estimations in Table 2. We find that the share predicted by the 1/n rule is positive and significant 
in Model 2 (b=.72; p<.01), confirming the descriptive data that the 1/n rule is the most common 
method of allocating royalty income shares, even after controlling for the experience of inventors, 
publication record of inventors, and the performance of inventors’ prior inventions.  
Partition dependence rule. Recall that the PD rule suggests that decision makers are 
influenced by the first naturally occurring partitions that come to the decision maker’s notice. For 
instance, Fox and Rottenstrich (2003) asked subjects in a laboratory study, “What is the probability 
that Sunday will be hotter than any day of the week?” This question suggests to decision makers a 
two-fold comparison: is Sunday hotter than each other day or not? Hence, they assigned 50% 
likelihood of it being hotter than other days. By comparison, asking them “What is the probability that 
Sunday will be the hottest day of the week?” suggests a seven-fold comparison, which results in 
decision makers correctly assess the probability to be 1/7. In another study, Langer and Fox (2003) 
replicate the work of Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and then extend it to show that an individual’s 
allocation varied by the order in which vendors and the number of funds were offered. Similarly, as 
noted above, Bardolet et al. (2011) found that senior executives were influenced by the grouping of 
the information for capital budget allocation of a hypothetical corporation by either geography 
divisions or product divisions, resulting in widely different allocations without any change in 
information content. Hence, prior laboratory evidence suggests that decision makers divide equally 
among the first hierarchical possibility that they notice and then subdivide again equally within 
subcategories within an allocation.  
The evidence from PD studies suggest a general rule that can be expressed as follows: If there 
are “m” unique partitions in the first hierarchical level that are salient to decision makers, then 
whatever is being allocated will be first shared equally among all “m” partitions. If there are “n” 
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 It is worthwhile to stress that in field data fixed effects for inventors allow us to account for individual 
differences that are trait like: risk seeking, optimism etc., which are unobserved.  
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unique sub-partitions that come second to decision makers’ attention, in each of the “m” partitions, 
then the number of first partitions— m  with index  mj ,...,1,0
. 
; number of sub-partitions in a 
partition j : jn . 
; an indicator variable  1,0ijd —takes on value 1 if a unique sub-partition “ i ” is 
represented in a set of j . In this case, the simple partition rule would result in a unique sub-partition, 
i , receiving the following share of whatever is being allocated:  



m
j j
ij
i
mn
d
s
1
. 
A numerical example from Bardolet et al. (2011) can be used to illustrate this general rule. If 
a hypothetical company were grouped by geography and then products—for instance, United States 
(Home, Beauty, Health), Europe (Home, Beauty Care), and Latin American (Home Care)—then each 
of the three geographic divisions (United States, Europe, and Latin America) would be allocated 
33.33% of the available capital. The subdivisions in Home Care would get 61.05% of the total budget, 
one third of the U.S. budget, one half of Europe’s budget, and Latin America’s entire budget 
(1/3*33.33+1/2*33.33+1*33.33=61.05%).  Whereas if the company were organized by product 
divisions and then by geographic subdivisions, i.e., Home Care (U.S., Europe, Latin America), Beauty 
Care, and Health Care, then Home Care would receive a budget of 33.33% each, which then would be 
split equally by the number of geographical subdivisions under each product division.  The 
implication again would be that the hierarchal structure of the hypothetical organization influences 
outcomes without any change in the information regarding the particular business outlook for a 
product/geography category (or vice versa). 
Partition dependence in our research setting. In the research setting we found that several 
inventions are bundled and licensed in one contract. These inventions have one or more common 
inventors. A simple 1/n rule would predict that the number of unique inventors in all of the inventions 
licensed in an agreement be counted and be given equal shares. A partition dependence prediction 
would seek out the first level of hierarchy that comes to decision makers’ notice and provide equal 
allocation at that level. The question then becomes, is the unique inventors the focal point or is the 
focal point the number of unique inventions followed by the number of inventors in each of those 
inventions? 
Our interviews of the licensing managers at the TTO suggested that the TTO and the licensee 
firm first established which discrete inventions were needed to practice a technology gainfully, as 
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suggested by this description from a licensing manager:
5
 “The basic flow is that the potential licensee 
is going to have an interest in a technology. That may be one patent, that may be ten patents, they 
have to evaluate that – so often you go under a confidentiality agreement and there’s a period where 
they need to evaluate the technology and then they finally get to a point where they understand its 
potential.”  Hence, we suggest that discrete inventions are the first hierarchical partition that comes to 
a decision maker’s notice. Therefore, according to the PD rule, each discrete invention in a license 
will get an equal share of the licensing income. The next level determines how to compensate the 
inventors. Again, if the PD rule guides decision making, then all the unique inventors of a particular 
invention will share equally in the allocation. If an inventor works on more than one invention, then 
her shares in each discrete invention are summed to arrive at her share for a licensed contract.  
The number of multiple partition contracts is 137. In such contracts, the PD rule explains 77% 
of all royalty income distribution among inventors perfectly. Thus, the behavioral rule of PD explains 
a vast majority of royalty income allocation in bundled contracts. 
-INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE- 
A partition dependence explanation predicts that when two or more inventions are bundled, it 
is not the 1/n rule but the partition dependence rule that predicts a focal inventor’s share. We test this 
in a sub-sample of agreements with two or more inventions in Models 5, 6, and 7. We find the 1/n rule 
is a significant predictor without the partition dependence rule in Model 6 (b=.56; p<.01). However, 
when the partition dependence rule is introduced, the predicting power of the 1/n rule (b=.045) 
disappears, and it is the partition dependence rule (b=.84; p<.01) that is a significant predictor, as 
shown in Model 5. The results of these estimations show that, over and above human capital 
variables, 1/n and partition dependence rules predict the shares a focal inventor receives for the vast 
majority of the number of inventions.   
-INSERT TABLE 2 HERE- 
 The main results thus far are that the 1/n rule perfectly predicts royalty income distribution in 
81% of the single invention contracts and that the PD rule predicts perfectly the shares of each 
inventor in 77% of all contracts when multiple inventions are bundled and licensed together.
6
 Perhaps 
                                                          
5
 Note each of the discrete inventions may not be equally valuable. Take for example a basic compound 
discovery which is usually more important that the method to extract it or a specific field of use, although all 
three may be required for practice of the invention. 
6
The point to note regarding the partition dependence allocation is that it is not obvious why two or more 
heterogeneous inventions should be treated as equal value and each individual inventor in such inventions get 
an equal share. The simple fairness rule would predict that the shares should be divided equally among unique 
inventors across all inventions in a bundled license (Messick, 2008). 
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it is pertinent here to mention a descriptive result on the income earned in the sample by N or PD 
licenses. If the percentage was approximately 80% of the total income then it would suggest that the 
type of regime used to share rewards and ultimate performance of the inventions does not matter. In 
our sample the income earned by N or PD licenses is only 41%. The non N or PD licenses are 
approximately 20% of the total deals and account for 60% of the total revenue. This calls for 
explanations of when teams do not use N or PD and the reason for lower share of total income of N or 
PD licenses. 
3. When do some teams not use 1/n or PD rules? 
Bargaining model. We use predictors suggested by the bargaining model as a starting point to 
explain when N and PD rules are less likely to be used (Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011). In the 
bargaining model, bargaining costs arise either from time wasted on bargaining or a psychological 
dislike of bargaining. Hence, when the expected value of a project is low, then equal shares are more 
likely, as there is less incentive to bargain about how team members should share income from a 
project. Second, an assumption of the model is that even if one individual team member demands to 
bargain, then bargaining occurs and reveals the marginal contribution of team members to the project. 
Third, given that a project is valuable and worth the bargaining effort, then bargaining unearths each 
individual’s marginal contribution to the team and therefore results in unequal allocation. This model 
suggests the use of the aforementioned N or PD rules is less likely under the following circumstances: 
i) the team size is large, as the chance of any single member asking for a negotiation to allocate 
incentives is greater in a larger team; ii) there is greater heterogeneity among team members; and iii) 
the expected value of the project is higher.  
We use the following variables to measure constructs from the bargaining model. Team size is the 
number of inventors in a license. Human capital heterogeneity is measured by invention and 
publication heterogeneity of the inventors in a license. For the expected value of a project, we use the 
following proxies: the citations received by the patents underlying an invention, the prior 
performance of the inventors’ inventions, and the size of the licensee firm. The size of the licensee 
firm is a proxy for the potential income that could be earned from a license. Large firms with presence 
in multiple geographically markets may provide more income. We also use other control variables in 
the estimations, such as grants, which include the dollar amount of funding received by the inventors’ 
department, the number of inventions bundled in a contract, and the proportion of inventors in a 
license who previously had worked together. The prior relationship between inventors is an important 
control. For one the search costs to find out marginal contribution may be lower as the inventors know 
each other’s potential contributions from prior relationship. Second the psychological distaste for 
bargaining among relations may be higher. Hence controlling for prior relationships between the 
inventors is important. An indicator variable is used to show whether an invention is 
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interdisciplinary—that is, if all inventors are from the same discipline or from different disciplines. 
Since it possible that bargaining costs may vary between same disciple teams and interdisciplinary 
teams it is important to control for this difference (Kotha, George, Srikanth, 2013). A variable to 
control for the stage of an invention uses the number of citations that an invention’s patent has made 
to other patents. Early stage inventions are more risky and if an invention builds on other established 
work it is less risky. The expertise of the licensee firm is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the firm has patents; otherwise, it is zero. We then estimate the probability that a contract adopts one 
of the N or PD rules to distribute royalty shares to inventors using the aforementioned explanatory 
variables. N or PD royalty sharing regime is an indicator variable that takes a value of “1” if 1/n in 
single invention contracts and partition dependence in multiple invention contracts predict royalty 
shares of inventors perfectly; otherwise, it is “0.” The intuition is that if an explanatory variable is 
positive (negative) and significant, then it suggests when inventors are more (less) likely to adopt the 
1/n or PD rule.  
Table 3 includes the summary statistics of the independent and control variables used in the 
estimation in two panels: not N or PD and N or PD. Recall that there are a total of 415 contracts in our 
sample, of which 85 are not assigned to an N or PD royalty income sharing regime. The average team 
size for non-N or PD regime contracts is 6.3 and 3.3 for N or PD (significant at p<.001), consistent 
with the bargaining model prediction. There is no difference between N or PD and non-N or PD 
contracts in publication and invention experience heterogeneity among team members in a contract. 
The prior performance of non-N or PD teams , measured by the prior income earned by the inventors 
is twice as high as the prior performance of N or PD contract team members (significant at p<.001), 
suggesting that teams with prior successful inventions are less likely to choose an N or PD regime, 
again consistent with the bargaining model prediction.  
-INSERT TABLES 3 & 4 HERE- 
 Next we test the descriptive results from the correlation analysis in a multivariate analysis 
using OLS estimation, a Logit estimation leads to similar results, with the dependent variable taking a 
value of 1 if the royalty sharing regime in a contract is N or PD. We report these results in Table 4. 
All estimations have domain and year fixed effects. Team size variable is negative and significantly 
related to the choice of N or PD regime (b=-.056; p<.01), consistent with the bargaining model 
prediction. Human capital heterogeneity variables—invention experience heterogeneity (b=.0068; 
p<.01) and publication experience heterogeneity (b=.11;p<.01)—are both positive and significant, 
implying that an increase in heterogeneity in a team increases the probability that the team would 
adopt an N or PD regime. This result is contrary to the bargaining model, which suggested that greater 
heterogeneity in the human capital of team members should cause team members to be less likely to 
choose N or PD regime. There is a negative relationship between the prior success of team members 
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with commercialization and choice of N or PD regime (b=-.0011; p<.05). Inventions licensed to large 
licensee firms are less likely to use N or PD allocation (b=-0.10; p.<01). There is no statistical 
relationship between patent citations and choice of an N or PD allocation.  
 In our sample there is a consistent pattern of results for the average and heterogeneity in 
human capital variables. When the average human capital of a team is higher, it is more likely that 
such a team will adopt N or PD regime.  On the other hand, when heterogeneity in human capital of a 
team is high, then the team is less likely to adopt N or PD regime. What could cause this pattern? We 
speculate that higher human capital leads to higher valued inventions, and, hence, inventors may be 
more willing to bargain when the stakes are higher. Why does heterogeneity not follow the prediction 
of the bargaining model? Could it be that heterogeneous teams invent lower valued inventions? In 
subsequent estimations wherein we examine the performance consequence of a contract regime we 
find that the heterogeneity in number of prior inventions among team members is not significant 
predictor of the income an invention earns and publication differences among team members is a 
weak positive predictor. Therefore we cannot draw the inference from our data that heterogeneous 
teams invent lower valued inventions. We discuss these results in greater detail in our conclusion and 
call for studies to explain this finding. 
 Some other results are worth noting beyond the theory variables. Teams that have a higher 
number of members who share prior collaborations are more likely to adopt N or PD regimes (b=.12; 
p<.01). Since the bargaining model has both the cost of effort needed to determine marginal 
contribution and the psychological distaste for bargaining, it could be argued that in repeated teams, 
psychological distaste for engaging in bargaining is high, though relative contributions can be easily 
identified by repeated team members (Rick, Weber, Camerer, 2007), or it could be the case that 
shirking is monitored better when there are multiple interactions or that logrolling across inventions 
even out over time.  Similarly, continuing inventions could have overlap of content and inventors, and 
they are also more likely to have N or PD regimes (b=.066; p<.01). Barring the heterogeneity in 
human capital variables, other theory and control variables support the intuition from the bargaining 
model regarding when teams deviate from N or PD regimes. 
4. What are the performance consequences of the use of 1/n or PD rules, if any? 
Recall that the rational view would suggest that the use of N or PD rules may suppress the effort 
needed from inventors and result in poor performance, per the classic economic model of moral 
hazard in teams (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) unless by random chance perfect incentives align with 
heuristic rules. This model suggests that when effort is hard to observe and costly, as well as when the 
profits of effort are equally shared among team members, each team member will have an incentive to 
contribute lower-than-profit-maximizing effort. The typical assumption is that the cost of effort is 
entirely borne by an individual and is a non-linear increasing function. At low levels of effort, the cost 
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of effort is low for an individual. When high levels of effort are required, an individual pays the cost 
of effort, but the returns on this effort are equally shared. Hence, the individual may not receive a 
return that is greater than the cost of her effort, leading to a situation wherein team members do not 
contribute optimal societal effort that maximizes revenue. Indeed, evidence from laboratory studies 
suggest that team members tend to devote less than optimal societal effort when rewards are equally 
shared (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997). If we assume that teams that chose to provide a higher share 
of returns to individuals who have the most value to offer, such that the effort garnered is maximized, 
then equal shares may diminish the desire of the most valuable team member to contribute effort 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Hence, from a societal point of view, if N or PDs lead to the muting of 
effort exerted by inventors that could otherwise have been exerted, then N or PD regimes are a drag 
on project performance. This negative relationship between an N or PD regime and performance of a 
project would be apparent even after controlling for the ex-ante quality of a project. That is, if two 
equal-quality projects were selected and one was assigned to N or PD and the other to not N or PDs, 
the N or PD regime project would have a lower ultimate performance than the non-N or PD regime 
project. Therefore, the shirking model would predict that the negative relationship between the choice 
of N or PD-based royalty sharing regimes and the performance of the project will not be fully 
mediated by the ex-ante quality of the project.  
Contrary to the shirking view above, from the perspective of the bargaining model (Hellmann and 
Wasserman, 2011), teams that adopt 1/n or PD rules may not perform any worse than those that adopt 
a different rule. In the bargaining model, the ex-ante expectation of project performance, i.e. “stake,” 
explains the switch between the use of N or PD and non-N or PD rules. When stakes are low, it is less 
likely that an inventor will engage in explicit bargaining, resulting in the use of 1/n or PD rule 
(Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011). Hence, N or PD regimes are more likely for low-valued ventures 
than high-valued ventures, resulting in the self-selection of low-valued ventures to N or PD royalty 
regimes (Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011). Therefore before we examine the shirking view, we must 
account for the fact that inventors with low values inventions may self-select into N or PD regime. 
However, the key point to note is that in the bargaining view a scientist is unlikely to shirk subsequent 
to choosing whether to use an N or PD regime to share royalty income. Hence, the bargaining view 
would predict that once one account’s for the fact that low quality inventions are self-selected to N or 
PD regime the performance of the project will be no worse off due to the choice of N or PD regime. 
To summarize the above discussion the bargaining view would predict that the negative relationship 
between the choice of an N or PD-based royalty income shares and performance of the project will be 
mediated by the quality of the project. In other words, once the ex-ante quality of the project is 
controlled for, then there will be no negative relationship between an N or PD-based regime and the 
performance of the project. Thus from the society’s point of view only after we had accounted for 
self-selection of low valued inventions to N or PD regime and  then if there is still a negative 
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relationship between N or PD contract choice and performance of the invention then this is evidence 
of shirking by team members. 
 We first test a simple association between an N or PD regime and performance of the licensed 
invention. In Table 5, Model 1, we first estimate a simple OLS regression with the natural log of 
revenue received from an invention as the dependent variable and the regime as an indicator variable. 
The N or PD regime takes a value of 1 if the regime is based on an N or PD, otherwise it is zero. The 
definitions and descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this estimation are the same as those in 
Table 3. Notice that in Table 3 the average non-N or PD contract yields nearly five times the revenue 
of an N or PD-based contract (see Table 3). This result is confirmed in OLS estimations. We find that 
the N or PD regime is negatively related to performance of a contract (b=-2.20; p<.01; Table 5).   
-INSERT TABLE 5 HERE- 
 The negative relationship between the use of N or PD royalty income sharing and 
performance of the invention, while consistent with the economic view, leads to a few intriguing 
questions. First, is it possible that inventors with low-value projects self-select to N or PD regimes? 
Second, do inventors in N or PD regimes expend less effort than they would have if only a different 
regime had been chosen? Finally, is it possible that both self-selection and some muting of effort 
occur? 
4.1 Is it selection, shirking, or both? Coarsened matched sample regression of performance of 
1/n and PD contracts 
 Examining whether or not shirking occurs in this context is complicated by our use of field 
data. We propose to tackle this challenge as follows. First, we will show how different the inventions 
in the N or PD are from inventions that are not licensed as N or PD just prior to invention licensing. 
We will use the human capital of the inventors, quality and stage of the project, and capabilities and 
size of the licensing firm. If inventions in N or PD and not N or PD are similar on these dimensions 
before licensing, then presumably the incentive regime adopted is the “only” variable left that 
influences performance. Hence, we need to measure how similar or different the inventions in N or 
PD are from not N or PD. 
 If the inventions in N or PD are very different than not N or PD, then it is imperative that we 
reduce this imbalance through matching. The goal should be for the imbalance to be as low as 
possible without reducing the sample to only a few observations.  We then will measure the 
performance of N or PD inventions that are matched with similar not N or PD inventions. If the 
variable N or PD is still negative and a significant predictor of performance of the invention, then this 
is consistent with the shirking interpretation.  
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 Furthermore, since matching is more an art than a science, we would also like to know how 
the above result changes if a different matching criteria is used. We relax the matching criteria by 
eliminating only one variable from the set at a time. Again, in the new set of predictions, we would 
like the imbalance between N or PD and not N or PD before licensing to be as low as possible. Below, 
we report the outcome of the process outlined above. 
Self-selection. A critical concern is that the negative relationship between licenses with N or 
PD incentive regime and performance of such licenses is endogenous. That is, the question is whether 
lower-ability inventors or those with lower-quality inventions chose an N or PD incentive regime. 
This then could fully explain the negative relation between the adoption of an N or PD incentive 
regime and the subsequent poor performance of the licensed invention. To rule out the effects of such 
self-selection, the innovation literature suggests using appropriate stringent matching of licenses that 
have, at the time of licensing, a similar level of inventor(s) and invention quality (Azoulay, Graff 
Zivin, and Manso, 2011; Singh and Agarwal, 2011).  
Measures. We reviewed the literature to identify measures of quality of the inventors and 
measures of the invention’s quality at the time of licensing.  Inventors’ quality could be measured as 
experience with inventing, prior collaborations between inventors in a team, inventors’ academic 
publications, and the prior performance of the inventions. The expectation is that inventors who have 
higher human capital are less likely to choose an N or PD incentive regime. Invention quality may 
vary independently of the inventors; that is, inventors with high ability may sometimes create low-
quality inventions, and vice versa. Hence, we measure the economic potential of the invention using 
the number of prior citations that the patent underlying the invention received and the stage of the 
invention. Furthermore, we also match licenses based on the quality of the licensee firms, the intuition 
being that inventions licensed to large or high-capability licensee firms would perform better than 
those licensed to smaller licensee firms. Hence, we include in the matching algorithm the size and 
expertise of the licensee firm.  
 Matching process. Recall that the objective of the matching process is to compare two equal-
quality inventions at the time of licensing, one that happens to be assigned to N or PD regime and the 
other to not N or PD regime. How similar are the N or PD and non-N or PD licenses in our sample 
before the matching process? A measure developed by Iacus et al (2009), “imbalance,” measures the 
level of similarity in the sub-samples. If two sub-samples are perfectly similar, then the imbalance 
score is “0” and if the two sub samples are very different than the score is “1.” The starting imbalance 
score “L” is 0.74 in our data. This suggests that the sample of N or PD and not N or PD inventions are 
very different on observable measures of quality. We run the coarsened matching procedure with the 
eight matching variables described above. The matching procedure chooses cases that have the least 
imbalance in the N or PD and non-N or PD regime sub-samples. Hence, the matching process drops 
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observations that are completely dissimilar. Post matching, we end up with 118 cases of licenses 
without the N or PD regime matched to 48 cases of licenses with the N or PD regime, and the 
imbalance reduces to 0.35, a 47% drop. We do not use one-to-one matching, as the sample size is too 
small; the cases that do not use N or PD sharing rules are only 21% of the total starting sample. For 
the sake of robustness, we rerun the results with one-to-one matching, and our result for the treatment 
variable (N or PD regime) is unchanged. In Table 6, we report summary statics of the matched sample 
by licenses with N or PD and without N or PD regimes. Even after matching, we can see that inventor 
experience and inventor publications are still different in the N or PD and not N or PD sub-samples. 
Recall that matching is not perfect; our aim is to reduce imbalance as much as possible without 
whittling away the size of the sample. 
-INSERT TABLE 6 HERE- 
  Results of matched estimations. In Table 7 we report the results estimations in the full sample 
without matching and in the matched sample. Models 1 and 2 are a full sample without and with the N 
or PD regime indicator variable, respectively. In Model 2’s full sample, the N or PD regime indicator, 
is negative and a significant predictor of the license’s performance (b=-1.89;p<.001). In the matched 
sample seen in Model 4, the N or PD regime indicator is negative but not significant (b=-.81; p=0.34). 
Notice that within the bar for inventor experience and inventor publications, there are no variables 
that are statistically different within this matched sample (Table 7: Model 3 and Model 4). This 
reinforces the fact that the matching has succeeded in balancing the ex-ante differences in project-
level quality based on observable factors. Conditional on the matching process working, the results in 
Table 7, Model 4 are consistent with a self-selection explanation. That is, inventors with low-
performing projects choose to use the N or PD rule, and the evidence does not support shirking as an 
explanation.  
-INSERT TABLE 7 HERE- 
Sensitivity of the N or PD performance result to the matching process. We check the 
sensitivity of the matching process by dropping each of the eight matching variables one at a time and 
then rerunning the matching process and estimating the performance of N or PD contracts. We report 
these results in Table 7A. Only in Model 6, when we drop the stage of the invention as a matching 
variable, do we find that the N or PD variable is negative and a significant predictor of revenues 
earned (b=1.47; p=.02). However, note the efficiency of the matching process. The initial imbalance 
was 0.66; post imbalance it was 0.59, which is the worst matched of all the samples. Recall that in the 
full model (Table 7: Model 4) with all the eight matching variables, the starting imbalance was .74 
and dropped to .35 post matching. This inspires much more confidence that, ex ante, the inventions in 
N or PD and not N or PD are more similar than matched estimation in Table 7A, Model 6. This 
suggests that, post matching, the contracts in the N or PD and not N or PD are still very different. 
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Hence, it is not possible to claim ex ante that the inventions had the same quality. Wherever the 
matching has done a reasonable job of reducing the ex-ante imbalance (as can be inferred from the 
low imbalance score post matching), we find that the coefficient of N or PD is not significant, 
although it is negative. Thus, our results cannot support shirking. 
-INSERT TABLE 7A HERE- 
4.2 Alternative explanations: Are there “types” of inventors? Do inventors learn when to use N 
or PD?  
Project level versus long-term analysis. The unit of analysis we employed in this paper to test 
the performance implications of the N or PD regime is itself a project. However, a case can be made 
that individuals who adopt an N or PD strategy for a project may attract several more collaborators, 
and the sum of the income from larger number of collaborations in the entire sample period is greater 
than the income in the entire sample period for those who do not adopt an N or PD, as they may have 
a lower number of collaborations, and, hence, lower period income. To examine this explanation, we 
divide inventors into three categories: only N or PD, both, and never N or PD. We found that 
inventors who use only N or PDs have the lowest total income in the sample period. Inventors who 
used only non-N or PD had higher total income in the sample period. The highest income was for 
those inventors who used both N or PD and non-N or PD regimes (see Figure 2). 
 Strategic switchers. In our sample, inventors can be classified into three broad types: those 
who always use N or PDs (298 cases), those who never use N or PDs (52 cases), and those who 
switch between N or PDs and non-N or PDs (65 cases). It could be that inventors who switch between 
N or PDs and non-N or PD have a better expectation of the ex-post performance of the projects. These 
inventors switch to non-N or PDs when they expect high performance and use N or PDs when they 
expect lower performance (Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011). Consistent with this insight, we found 
that inventors who switch between N or PDs and non-N or PDs, hereafter referred to as “strategic 
switchers,” had an income of $60,446 when they use non-N or PD royalty sharing rules and $15,322 
when they use N or PDs (see Figure 2). This finding reinforces the self-selection argument over the 
shirking argument, as otherwise it would be necessary to construct and believe in an explanation 
where inventors shifted between shirking rather than royalty regimes, such that the same inventor 
would shirk on one project and devote effort to another project systematically depending on regime. 
-INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE- 
To take the above insight further, we run the performance estimation using the refined 
inventor types: never N or PD, strategic switchers, and always N or PD. We report these results in 
Table 8. Model 1 is the baseline model with the simple N or PD regime indicator variable used in the 
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performance estimations in Table 7. In Model 2, we replace this variable with the inventor type: never 
N or PDs, always N or PDs, and strategic switchers. The comparison category is the group of 
inventors in the sample period who have never used the N or PD rule to share royalty income.  When 
compared to those inventors who never use the N or PD rule, those who always use the N or PD rule 
perform worse (b=-2.21, p<.001). However, the key point to note is that the performance of strategic 
switchers (b=-1.21) is not statistically different from those who never use the N or PD rule Therefore 
strategic switchers appear to perform just as well as those who always chose not N or PD even though 
strategic switchers are switching between N or PD and not N or PD 
-INSERT TABLE 8 HERE- 
 In Model 3 we refine the strategic switchers into two categories: cases when they did or did 
not use N or PD. Again we compare these categories with those who never used N or PD in the 
sample period.  First, the result of the difference between never and always N or PD is the same as in 
Model 2. Those who use N or PD always perform lower than those who never use N or PD (b=-2.18, 
p<.001). We are more interested in finding out what happens to strategic switchers when they use or 
do not use N or PD rules. As compared to those who never use N or PD, the coefficient of strategic 
switchers when they used N or PD is weakly significant (b=-1.73; p<.07). Thus, when strategic 
swicthers use the N or PD rule, they earn less income as compared to those who never use the N or 
PD rule. This explanation is consistent with both the shirking and self-selection arguments, as we had 
not performed matching on similar projects. Once we match and rerun the analysis, this weakly 
negative relationship is not significant.  
Learning. The shirking model would suggest that inventors learn from the negative 
experience of using N or PD and subsequently choose shares that are not N or PD. By contrast, the 
bargaining model would suggest that such shifts would be based on the value of the invention and 
other variables listed. If the null assumption is that inventions with high and low value are randomly 
sequenced in time, then shifts that occur with the value of the invention would have a random pattern. 
We pick the most experienced inventors who exhibited a more pronounced switching pattern between 
the use of N or PD rules and not N or PD in the sample period; their choices are listed in Figure 3. 
There is no discernible pattern that explains why inventors switch with time. Therefore, learning 
about the drawback of equal shares does not explain the choice of incentive selection as predicted by 
the shirking model. Recall the switching is consistent with high-valued inventions by strategic 
switchers being licensed as not N or PD (see Figure 2 for average value of an invention in a regime).  
-INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE- 
We test this intuition using a non-parametric Wald–Wolfowitz run test (Swed & Eisenhart, 
1943). The test uses the pattern of the number of adjacent ‘0’ or ‘1’ and compares this against the null 
 18 
 
hypothesis that this pattern is random. For example, consider a toss of a coin represented by 1 if heads 
and 0 if tails, then patterns as 1010101010 and 111000111, which have 10 and 3 runs, respectively.  
Runs are sequence of similar outcomes. The number of runs and how long  a sequence lasts can be 
used to measure if it is random. The intuition being too few runs, too many runs or excessive long 
runs are deviations away from randomness. Obviously, the more the number of observations the 
easier it is to say if a sequence is random or not.  We classify the choice by a lead inventor, who is a 
strategic switcher, to use N or PD as ‘1’ and not N or PD as ‘0’. We order the choice of regime as 
represented by ‘1’ or ‘0’sequentially by time, with the older coming first. Hence we observe a 
sequence of 0 and 1 for each of these inventors. We test the randomness of the sequence of 0 and 1 for 
each inventor.  We report these results in Table 9. Only two inventors appear to have a pattern of 
choice that is non-random.  Notice also that the number of observations for each inventor is only a 
few. Thus, we use an alternative test. At its heart is a comparison of the observed pattern with a 
hypothetical pattern suggested by the learning argument. 
It would be straightforward to assume that an inventor can make a relative comparison 
between the use of N or PD and not N or PD only if he has experienced both choices himself. After 
making this assumption, we follow what a simple learning argument would suggest for the choice of 
contract regime. A learning argument would suggest that the first time an inventor has not used N or 
PD after having used N or PD, then the inventor can make relative comparisons. In the relative 
comparisons, the inventor may learn about the advantages of not using N or PD. Hence, the inventor 
should henceforth not use N or PD. Therefore, the learning rule then gives a ‘conjectural choice’ 
pattern of N or PD and not N or PD for each inventor. The rule is the first time a pair of alternative 
choices is present; thereafter, the inventor should not chose N or PD. We then use the observed choice 
and the conjectural choice suggested by the learning view to predict the income earned by the 
invention. We find that when we use the two variables, observed choice and learning-rule-based 
choice, to predict the value of an invention, it is only the observed choice that predicts the invention 
value (p<.07) and not the learning rule (p<.4). This confirms again that strategic switchers shift with 
the value of the invention rather than due to the fact that they have learnt that N or PD regimes had 
shirking problems. Hence, our data suggests that shifts occur more with the value of a project rather 
than from learning from experience with a royalty income sharing regime. Thus, we conclude that 
switching is random in time but not random in project value. 
-INSERT TABLE 9 HERE- 
Fairness. In this paper we cannot tell if inventors in the equal and unequal shared rewards 
condition thought the allocations were fair. However, the most obvious alternative causal mechanism 
to the cognitive conservation of effort leading to 1/n allocation that we had advanced is that inventors 
are guided by fairness norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Messick, 2008; Pillutla and Murnighan, 
1996). Fairness and cognitive conservation of effort leading to 1/n are indistinguishable when it 
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comes to sharing royalties in single invention contracts. However, when multiple inventions are 
licensed in a contract, then fairness norms would indicate each unique inventor would get an equal 
share. It is hard to argue that two or more unequal value inventions should get equal shares first, as 
predicted by the partition dependence. Hence, we offer evidence from the multiple invention contracts 
that is consistent with conserving cognitive effort on the part of the decision makers rather than 
concerns of pure fairness guiding royalty income allocations. However, the deep literature on fairness 
distinguishes between procedural and allocative fairness (Folger and Konovsky, 1989) and suggests 
that procedural fairness requires that decision makers follow fair rules even in the face of unequal 
outcomes. It could be that the use of PD is procedurally fair but leads to unequal allocation at the 
individual level. This question is beyond the scope of this paper and the data available. 
 Tradeoffs. Another explanation is that inventors who accept N or PD regime are focused on 
academic work and, hence, are willing to accept N or PD royalty income shares. This explanation is 
consistent with the bargaining cost hypothesis (Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011) that inventors prefer 
to focus on academic work rather than take time away from or impinge on academic collaborations. If 
this were the case, then those who use N or PD should be particularly productive academic 
researchers. Yet we found that the academic productivity of inventors who used only N or PD regime 
or never used N or PD regime in the sample period to be no different than that of other inventors. 
Rather, it is strategic switchers who used both N or PD and non-N or PD regimes in the period who 
have the highest scientific productivity significance level (see Figure 4). This finding again is 
consistent with the idea that no side payments are occurring in the publication domain to make up for 
the use of N or PD in the commercial domain. More importantly, the finding is consistent with the 
idea that those with the best knowledge self-select in N or PD and non-N or PD regimes as the 
expected royalties grow. 
-INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE- 
 To briefly summarize the results, we find that the use of N or PD is highly prevalent, 
comprising 80% of the cases in our sample, and that the use of N or PD is negatively correlated with 
the performance of the invention as the share of revenues from N or PD is only 41% of the total 
revenues in the sample. We explored two explanations for this negative relationship: shirking or self-
selection by inventors with lower-quality projects to N or PD royalty sharing agreement.  The 
preponderance of the evidence suggests that self-selection rather than shirking explains the negative 
relationship. Furthermore, strategic switchers are not learning not to use N or PD but choosing royalty 
regimes based on the expected size of the royalties.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
 Somewhat surprisingly, the results of this paper are consistent with both a behavioral and 
rational perspective. On the one hand, N or PD is the dominant sharing mechanism in the vast 
majority of both single and multiple royalty contracts. Furthermore, these rules are used when serious 
money is at stake, much more than in experiments. However, consistent with a rational bargaining 
model, unequal shares result when the stakes are very large, the count of bargainers is high, or 
inventors have successful licensed in the past. 
Another unanticipated finding of this paper is the “strategic switching” behavior of some 
inventors in the sample period. We found that some inventors chose to have N or PD regime when the 
potential income from the invention is low. When potential income from the invention is high, 
however, they distributed income unequally. These “strategic switchers” have the highest income in 
the sample period as well as the highest academic productivity in terms of publications and citations. 
Some elements of this strategic switching behavior are anticipated by Hellman and Wasserman 
(2011), yet we found subtle but important differences in the evidence. First, the average income of 
strategic switchers is $15,322 when they share royalty incomes equally, significantly more than the 
average income of inventors who always share equally ($9,957). This finding suggests that those 
presumed to be “good” at negotiating should have a lower cost of engaging in negotiation. Hence, we 
would expect that when strategic switchers share equally, their inventions should have the lowest 
performance. By contrast, when they share expected income equally, their inventions perform better 
than those of inventors who always share income equally. Second, team heterogeneity on relevant 
human-capital dimensions was posited to be negatively related to the choice to equally share income, 
but we find that team heterogeneity is a positive predictor of equal sharing of royalty income. These 
important differences aside, the central finding that the same individuals switch to unequal incentives 
when more money is at stake is consistent with the bargaining model by Hellmann and Wasserman 
(2011). 
5.1 Implications of our results 
 This study is the first to test partition dependence usage by groups using field data. We find 
that when multiple inventions are bundled, potential income is equally divided among inventions and 
then equally to each inventor within a project 77% of the time. This prediction is consistent with 
theory and evidence developed primarily in laboratory studies using individuals to predict 
probabilities of events. Recent lab work using experienced managers also finds that when they 
allocate capital in their individual capacity, they are prone to first allocate by the partition that is 
prominent first—either geography or product—and then to subdivisions with each category equally.  
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A second finding of this paper is that an overwhelming majority of all deals in the sample, 
79%, have equally shared royalty income, yet they comprise only 40% of the sample’s total value. 
Inherent in that descriptive statistic is the implication that, on average, equally shared deals perform 
lower than deals that are not equally shared.  
We developed predictions for why some deals and not others would be shared equally and the 
performance consequences of the deal due to a particular type of incentive distribution. Our results 
confirm that lower-quality inventions are assigned to equal sharing of royalty income. Conditional on 
matching inventions of the same quality, and assuming that these equal-quality inventions are 
randomly assigned to either equal or unequal sharing of regimes, the results of our matched sample 
estimation support the view that type of royalty income sharing distribution in itself does not mute or 
amplify performance of the deal. 
One of the null expectations was that homogenous teams would be more likely to equally 
share incentives than heterogeneous teams because the marginal contribution of each team member 
would presumably be nearly the same. The results of the estimation that predicted when teams would 
have equally or unequally shared incentives finds that heterogeneity in team-member invention 
experience and publication experience is more likely to result in such teams adopting equal incentives, 
contrary to a priori intuition. When we probed this result further to see if there was specialization—
i.e, team members having high human capital on different dimensions—we found this was not the 
case; inventors with high publications also had high invention experience. Therefore, there was no 
expertise specialization in a team, an intriguing result that calls for future work. Teams that on 
average have higher human capital are more likely to share royalty income unequally, consistent with 
the explanation that the inventions of higher-quality teams have a greater economic potential. Hence, 
when more money is a stake, members are more likely to negotiate reward distribution, and any 
negotiation is more likely to result in some deviation from perfectly equal distribution of royalty 
income.  A fruitful area for future laboratory and field research would be to examine why 
heterogeneous teams are more likely to have equal incentives than homogenous ones. 
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5.2 Equality Norm of Science  
Given that scientists are inculcated in norms of scientific behavior (Merton, 1973), norms of 
equality may induce them to treat one another’s contributions as equal. We conducted extensive 
interviews of licensing managers, legal counselors, and senior management at the research site. We 
also reviewed invention reports, correspondence, and other documents to understand the processes at 
the research site. We found in the reports of managers at the TTO a case that illustrates the generosity 
norm of scientists:  
[I]nventor X would like to include his technician as an inventor, saying that without her, the 
work would not have been accomplished.  Similarly, inventor X pursued this work because of 
Y’s suggestion.  Y is a professor at another university. Inventor X believes that both the 
technician and Y should get a share of the income.  
Consider two other cases reviewed by the TTO officer wherein inventors were more generous 
than necessary:  
 “X lists Y as an inventor on her IDR.  Y’s contribution was providing small quantities 
of the ILK inhibitor KP392.  He did not participate in the conception of the idea, and 
I feel that his inclusion as an inventor may be doubtful.”   
 “Professor X would like to include Y and Z as inventors.  However, his description at 
our meeting of their contributions did not seem to rise to the level of inventorship.”  
Based on such cases, we might conclude that scientists are more generous than other 
professionals due to scientific norms. The 80% of equal shared projects in our sample is much higher 
than that of entrepreneurs sharing ownership equally (60%) and joint venture partners sharing 
investments (67%), although it should be noted that less capital may be at stake in scientist endeavors. 
In addition, field evidence shows that scientists routinely give up higher-paying jobs for their research 
careers (Stern, 2004). Hence, scientists in our sample may be so focused on research and teaching that 
they find bargaining over income share to be more psychologically distasteful and time consuming 
than other samples (Hellmann and Wasserman, 2011). 
That said, the PD method of sharing royalty income often leads to unequal shares due to the 
number of inventions bundled and the number which an individual is listed as an inventor. Suppose 
there are two inventors, A and B, and two inventions bundled in a contract, 1 and 2. Assume that 
inventor A is listed as an inventor for both inventions and inventor B is listed only for Invention 1. 
The PD rule predicts that equal shares will be given to Invention 1 and 2 and then equal shares to each 
inventor for each invention. As a result, Inventor A receives 75% (25% from Invention 1 + 50% from 
Invention 2) of the total contract revenue, and Inventor B receives 25% shares of the royalty income. 
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Since Inventor B is listed as inventor on only one invention, Invention 1, he gets half of the Invention 
1’s share of royalties. Invention 1 gets 50% share of the royalties as there are a total of two inventions, 
each of which get 50%. Therefore, the PD rule results in unequal final allocations unless all inventors 
engage in each invention. In our data, the use of the PD rule results in the lead inventor receiving 34% 
and other inventors 12% of a contract income, on average (see Figure 5). Therefore, the PD rule 
provides higher shares to lead inventors. 
-INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE- 
5.3 Limitations 
This study is not without limitations. Chiefly, any single result from field data is open to 
multiple interpretations of the causal mechanisms that lead to the result; hence, researchers using field 
data apply the threshold of a pattern of results taken together supporting one view rather than another. 
We find deviations from N or PDs when more money is at stake, as predicted by a model of 
bargaining costs. A set of results that completely support the behavioral or the economic view would 
have made the findings more definitive. One key inference from our results, once we account for low-
quality inventions being systemically assigned equal shares to inventors, is that scientists do not 
appear to shirk. Future studies that measure effort in more direct ways could investigate this insight, 
as we are unable to using the existing field data. 
Another limitation of this study is our extrapolation from the theory of partition dependence, 
which has primarily been shown in laboratory studies of single individuals judging probabilities or 
allocating resources to a group distribution task. We suggest and find evidence for the partition 
dependence prediction. As field data cannot perfectly isolate a single causal mechanism (Camerer, 
2012), a laboratory study on the prevalence of partition dependence among groups and limits to 
partition dependence would be highly desirable. 
5.4 Contribution 
 We examine two competing views on how income from royalty is shared in self-forming 
teams and the consequences of incentive regime on the performance of projects. We find that nearly 
80% of all deals use N or PD rules. We also provide field evidence that partition dependence 
influences choice of royalty shares an inventor receives. Prior work on partition dependence has 
mostly used laboratory studies and has examined a single decision maker judging probabilities or 
allocating investments. Teams deviate from an N or PD choice when they have prior successful 
inventions. There is a negative relationship between projects with N or PD regime and performance. 
Our matched sample estimations reveal that the negative relationship between N or PD regime and 
performance is absent once the self-selection of lower-quality projects to N or PD regime has been 
accounted for. This result is important, as we focus on the inventions of academic scientists, whose 
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breakthroughs often influence several domains and improve societal welfare. If scientific discoveries 
are not turned into products and services due to misaligned incentives among academic inventors, 
then society is worse off.  
We found a negative correlation between the use of N or PD rules to share royalty income and 
the performance of such inventions. The bulk of the evidence we studied to determine whether this 
negative relationship is due to self-selection or shirking by inventors suggests the former explanation 
is appropriate; only a weakly significant result in a poorly matched sample is consistent with the 
shirking explanation. Thus, we conclude that in our setting, the use of N or PD incentive regimes does 
not impose a significant cost on society in large part because the most productive scientists know 
when and when not to deviate from equal sharing. 
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Figure 1: Structure of Equal and Unequally Shared License Revenue between Inventors 
Partitions by 
inventions bundled 
in a license 
106 Equal share to inventions 
and then equal shares to 
inventors in an invention  
3 Unequal shares to inventions 
and then unequal shares to 
inventors in an invention  
3 Equal shares to inventions 
and then unequal shares to 
inventors in an invention  
25 Equal shares to inventions 
and then unequal shares to 
inventors in an invention  
137 Bundled 
invention 
licenses 
224 Equal 
shares to all 
inventors 
54 Unequal 
shares to all 
inventors 
278 Single 
invention 
licenses 
415 License 
agreements 
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Table 1:  Summary statistics and correlations 
Inventor share is the share an inventor receives in a license. The other variables are as follows: publications, the natural log of cumulative publications that an 
inventor has minus the average for the team;  invention experience, the total experience the inventor has prior to the licensing of the current agreement minus 
the average for the team; one-by-N is the inventor’s share, predicted by 1 divided by the number of unique inventors in a licensed agreement; partition 
dependence, the share predicted by the division of a licensed agreement by number of unique inventions in the licensed agreement and then by the number of 
unique inventors in each of those licensed inventions.  
 Variables mean sd min max 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Inventor share 0.3 0.2 0.0007 0.83 1     
2 Publications -0.3 1.4 -4.3 3.4 0.327*** 1    
3 Experience -0.2 1.0 -3.8 3.8 0.403*** 0.619*** 1   
4 Size 6.1 5.5 2 26 -0.636*** -0.242*** -0.349*** 1  
5 1/N Rule 0.3 0.1 0.038 0.5 0.828*** 0.175*** 0.263*** -0.769*** 1 
6 Partition Dependence  0.3 0.2 0.004 0.83 0.950*** 0.328*** 0.429*** -0.669*** 0.866*** 
N=1723; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2:  Inventor Fixed Effects Estimations of Share an Inventor Receives in a Licensed Agreement 
The dependent variable for the analysis is the share an inventor receives in a licensed agreement. If 
the license has more than one invention bundled into it, then it is the sum of the shares across all 
inventions that an inventor is part of in an agreement. Explanatory variable are as follows: 
publications, the natural log of cumulative publications that an inventor has minus the average for 
the team;  invention experience, the total experience the inventor has prior to the licensing of the 
current agreement minus the average for the team; one-by-N, inventor’s share, predicted by 1 
divided by the number of unique inventors in a licensed agreement; partition dependence, the share 
predicted by the division of a licensed agreement by the number of unique inventions in the licensed 
agreement and then by the number unique inventors in each of those licensed inventions. Year fixed 
effects are included but not reported. Models 1, 2, and 3 use the full sample. Model 4 is the sub-
sample with one invention per contract. In Model 4, 1/N rule and partition dependence rule are the 
same; hence, partition dependence is dropped as an explanatory variable in Model 5. Models 5, 6, 
and 7 are the subsample with two or more inventions per contract.  
Dependent 
variable: Inventor’s 
share of revenue 
(%) 
All inventions Single 
invention 
Multiple inventions 
       
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Difference in 
publications 
-0.012 0.0066 0.0031 -0.0070 0.017** 0.021* 0.017** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Difference in 
invention 
experience 
-0.012 -0.011* -0.0030 -0.027*** -0.0018 -0.00097 -0.0019 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
        
1/n rule  0.72*** 0.043* 1.00*** 0.045 0.56***  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  
        
Partition rule   0.94***  0.84***  0.87*** 
   (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
        
Constant 0.29*** 0.071** 0.013 -0.0088 0.052** 0.100*** 0.057** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
r2 0.032 0.49 0.80 0.77 0.68 0.36 0.68 
N 1735 1735 1735 934 801 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 3: Summary Statistic at the Level of Invention 
Performance is the amount of money that an invention receives.  Grant windfall is the log of 
the dollars received in the domain of the inventors in a year. Team size is the number of 
inventors in an invention. Number of inventions bundled is the total number of inventions 
bundled and licensed together. Prior collaborations are the proportion of inventors in a team 
that had prior inventions together. Invention experience is the average number of inventions 
disclosed by the inventors. Publications is the average number of publications of the 
inventors. Interdisciplinary is when all inventors come from the same domain or different 
domains. Prior performance is the income from licensing prior to focal invention. Cites 
received are the forward patent citations received. Late-stage inventions measure the citations 
made to other patents. Continuing invention describes whether the current invention is stand-
alone or related to prior inventions by the inventors. Licensee size is whether the licensee is a 
public company. Licensee expertise is whether the licensee has patents in the domain of the 
focal invention. 
 
 
Not N or PDs (N=85)   N or PDs (N=330) 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. T-test 
Performance ('000) 125,612.9 660430.0   22,850.5 77597.7 ** 
Grant windfall (lg) 188.7 84.7   126.6 91.9 *** 
Team size 6.3 5.0   3.3 1.8 *** 
Number of inventions bundled 4.0 7.2   1.8 1.8 *** 
Prior collaborations 0.1 0.2   0.2 0.4 *** 
Invention experience 11.3 24.2   3.8 8.0 *** 
Invention experience s.d. 8.4 19.0   3.9 12.7 
 Publications 3.4 0.7   2.7 0.9 *** 
Publications s.d. 3.4 0.8   3.4 1.0 
 Interdisciplinary 0.2 0.2   0.3 0.4 
 Agreement type 0.5 0.5   0.3 0.5 *** 
Prior performance 82.5 57.5   41.0 47.9 *** 
Cites received 0.2 1.0   0.3 0.9 
 Late stage invention 0.2 0.6   0.3 0.7 
 Continuing invention 1.4 3.2   0.9 1.6 
 Licensee size 0.5 0.5   0.2 0.4 *** 
Licensee expertise 0.3 0.5   0.4 0.5 ** 
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of Choice of N or PD Regime 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
 
Dependent variable: N or PD (1/0) Model 1 
   
Grant windfall -0.0012*** (0.00) 
Team size -0.056*** (0.01) 
Number of inventions bundled -0.017 (0.01) 
Prior collaborations 0.12*** (0.04) 
Invention experience -0.0073** (0.00) 
Invention experience s.d. 0.0068*** (0.00) 
Publications -0.11*** (0.02) 
Publications s.d. 0.11*** (0.02) 
Interdisciplinary -0.040 (0.05) 
Prior performance of inventors -0.0011** (0.00) 
Citations of patent 0.011 (0.02) 
Late stage 0.010 (0.03) 
Continuing invention 0.066*** (0.02) 
Licensee size -0.10*** (0.04) 
Licensee expertise 0.0057 (0.04) 
Constant 1.50*** (0.37) 
r2 0.50  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Table 5: Results of Performance Estimations 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
 OLS Performance 
  
N or PD -2.20*** (0.65) 
Grant windfall -0.0025 (0.00) 
Team size -0.066 (0.12) 
Number of inventions 
bundled 
-0.19 (0.15) 
Prior collaborations 2.23*** (0.55) 
Invention experience -0.0068 (0.04) 
Invention experience s.d. 0.020 (0.03) 
Publications -0.0050 (0.29) 
Publications s.d. -0.48* (0.27) 
Interdisciplinary -0.34 (0.63) 
Prior performance of 
inventors 
0.0044 (0.01) 
Citations of patent 0.73*** (0.26) 
Late stage 0.077 (0.32) 
Continuing invention 0.34 (0.22) 
Licensee size 1.28*** (0.49) 
Licensee expertise 0.022 (0.44) 
Constant 10.5** (4.63) 
r2 0.30  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of the Matched Sample 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
Variable N or PD (118) Not N or PD (48) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Prior collaborations 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Inventor experience 9.5 28.2 0.0 179.0 20.3 48.9 0.0 179.0 
Inventor publications 70.3 87.2 2.0 552.0 114.2 138.9 23.0 552.0 
Prior performance 27.6 44.1 0.0 158.0 67.4 61.5 0.0 156.0 
Quality of invention 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Late stage invention 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.8 
Licensee size 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Licensee capabilities 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 
Table 7: Results of Performance Estimations with and without matched sample 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
 
 
Full Sample Matched Sample 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
Constant -8.63* (5.17) -7.76 (5.09) -6.19 (5.72) -6.00 (5.73) 
Prior collaborations 1.91*** (0.50) 2.23*** (0.50) -0.83 (1.11) -0.77 (1.11) 
Inventor experience 0.012 (0.01) 0.0089 (0.01) 0.080** (0.03) 0.081** (0.03) 
Inventor publications -0.0086** (0.00) -0.0078** (0.00) -0.026** (0.01) -0.026** (0.01) 
Prior performance 0.0093* (0.01) 0.0054 (0.01) 0.0029 (0.01) 0.0013 (0.01) 
Quality of invention 0.63*** (0.24) 0.68*** (0.23) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Late stage invention -0.20 (0.32) -0.12 (0.31) -3.03 (2.20) -3.05 (2.20) 
Licensee size 1.69*** (0.47) 1.45*** (0.47) 0.91 (0.95) 0.88 (0.95) 
Licensee capabilities -0.15 (0.43) -0.056 (0.42) -0.62 (0.84) -0.66 (0.84) 
N or PD (1/0)   -1.89*** (0.53)   -0.81 (0.85) 
Domain fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
r2 0.28 
 
0.30 
 
0.32 
 
0.32                
N 415 
 
415 
 
166 
 
166                
Standard errors in parentheses;* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 7A: Results of Performance Estimations with and without matched sample 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
Prior collaborations 
  
-0.13 (1.10) 0.67 (0.93) 0.21 (0.95) -0.22 (1.05) -0.19 (0.98) -0.79 (0.99) -0.81 (1.07) 
Inventor experience 0.081** (0.03) 
  
0.0097 (0.02) 0.057** (0.02) 0.035* (0.02) 0.050** (0.02) 0.040** (0.02) 0.071** (0.03) 
Inventor publications -0.026*** (0.01) -0.0042 (0.01) 
  
-0.024*** (0.01) -0.017* (0.01) -0.014** (0.01) -0.020** (0.01) -0.022** (0.01) 
Prior performance 0.0041 (0.01) 0.0068 (0.01) -0.0076 (0.01) 
  
0.0063 (0.01) -0.0052 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.00017 (0.01) 
Quality of invention 0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  
  
0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  
Late stage invention -2.95 (2.15) -3.77* (2.22) -4.17* (2.34) -1.85 (1.44) -0.62 (1.48) 
  
-1.85 (1.47) -3.33 (2.17) 
Licensee size 1.42* (0.78) 0.92 (0.97) 0.89 (0.97) 0.88 (0.80) 0.96 (0.89) 0.76 (0.83) 
  
1.2 (0.90) 
Licensee capabilities -0.49 (0.73) -0.56 (0.85) -0.29 (0.70) -0.14 (0.76) -0.67 (0.78) -0.23 (0.63) -0.72 (0.72) 
  N or PD (1/0) -1.01 (0.79) -0.74 (0.86) -1.04 (0.75) -1 (0.64) -1.14 (0.80) -1.47** (0.66) -1.18 (0.75) -0.87 (0.81) 
                 Domain fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
                 Matched case: not N or PD 49 
 
46 
 
48 
 
68 
 
51 
 
53 
 
61 
 
749 
 Matched cases: N or PD 128 
 
117 
 
161 
 
179 
 
127 
 
172 
 
127 
 
123 
 Imbalance after matching 0.41 
 
0.32 
 
0.22 
 
0.57 
 
0.29 
 
0.59 
 
0.25 
 
0.33 
 Imbalance before matching 0.72 
 
0.73 
 
0.69 
 
0.63 
 
0.72 
 
0.66 
 
0.7 
 
0.72 
 Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Figure 2: Period Income for an Inventor by type of Regime 
 
 
Table 8: Results of Performance Estimations with Inventor Type 
(All variables are defined in Table 3) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
Prior collaborations 2.23*** (0.50) 2.20*** (0.50) 2.24*** (0.51) 
Inventor experience 0.0089 (0.01) 0.0091 (0.01) 0.0088 (0.01) 
Inventor publications -0.0078** 
0.00  
-0.0075** 
0.00  
-0.0076** 
0.00  
Prior performance 0.0054 (0.01) 0.0048 (0.01) 0.0049 (0.01) 
Quality of invention 0.68*** (0.23) 0.75*** (0.24) 0.72*** (0.24) 
Late stage invention -0.12 (0.31) -0.11 (0.31) -0.11 (0.31) 
Licensee size 1.45*** (0.47) 1.57*** (0.47) 1.49*** (0.47) 
Licensee capabilities -0.056 (0.42) -0.0065 (0.43) -0.029 (0.43) 
N or PD(1/0) -1.89*** (0.53) 
 
 
 
 Strategic Switchers 
  
-1.21 (0.80) 
 
 Always N or PD 
  
-2.21*** (0.65) -2.18*** (0.65) 
Strategic Switchers: N or PD 
    
-1.73* (0.95) 
Strategic Switchers: not N or 
PD     
-0.61 
(0.99) 
Domain fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
r2 0.22 
 
0.24 
 
0.24 
 Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Figure 3: Revenues By Type of Regime and By Inventor’s Experience 
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Table 9: Test of Randomness of Choice between N or PD by Strategic Switchers 
Inventor 
ID Observations N(runs) Prob>|z| 
3 3 2 0.48 
5 7 2 0.11 
6 3 2 0.48 
12 2 2 -- 
13 2 2 -- 
15 4 3 0.32 
16 5 4 0.51 
18 44 2 0.001 
21 21 12 0.33 
28 3 2 0.48 
33 2 2 -- 
38 3 2 0.48 
47 16 2 0.01 
50 3 2 0.48 
51 2 2 -- 
60 3 2 0.48 
62 3 2 0.48 
63 3 2 0.48 
64 7 2 0.11 
 
 
Figure 4: Period Publications 
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Figure 5: Share in a PD Contract of a Lead and Other Inventors 
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